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TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) WORKING
GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 18, 2010

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-063.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 18, 2010

Time: 3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) During a meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group (WG), the U.S. and Russian sides exchanged Joint Draft Texts (JDT) of Part Two of the Protocol (Database) and discussed the Russian proposal for the Annex on Inspection Activities (Part Four, Procedures for Site Diagrams). There was general agreement that the sides were fairly close to agreement conceptually on Site Diagrams, and the Russian side presented a logical restructuring of the document. The sides discussed the need for an agreed procedure for bringing Russian mobile launchers of ICBMs into deployed status, the existence of training ICBM silos in the new treaty, and requirements for photographs of new missile systems. The Russian side stood firm on its desire for unique identifiers (UIDs) for all heavy bombers, and it proposed converted B1Bs be listed as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments in

Part II of the Protocol until the U.S. exhibition of distinguishing features. End summary.

¶4. (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Lots of Paper Exchanged; Getting into the Details; Mostly in Agreement; The Most Painful Part; Questions on Other Issues; and Just When We Thought We Were Done.

LOTS OF PAPER EXCHANGED

¶5. (S) Gen Orlov presented the U.S. side with the Russian-proposed JDT of Part Two of the Protocol (Database), and noted that most of the remaining brackets related to mobile launchers. He said it was up to the U.S. side to remove them. He also presented the Russian proposal for the Annex on Inspection Activities (Part Four, Procedures for Site Diagrams). Mr. Trout presented the Russian side with the U.S.-proposed JDT of Part Two of the Protocol (Database).

¶6. (S) The Russian side had reviewed the U.S. proposal for the

text on site diagrams dated February 9, 2010 and Orlov believed 80 percent of the document could be agreed to at the meeting. He was concerned by a comment made by Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller that it took 18 months to agree on the last five percent of issues in START, but he noted he was optimistic that the sides could come to agreement on any outstanding issues soon.

GETTING INTO THE DETAILS

¶7. (S) Orlov asked Col Petrov to explain the format and content of the Russian proposal on site diagrams which the U.S. side had just received. Petrov said that first, the Russian side believed that the beginning of the document should indicate what is really being asked for, so they reordered the document to have the U.S.-proposed paragraph 2 at the beginning (site diagrams...shall be provided). Petrov asked why the U.S. proposal required that all facilities located within the ICBM base for silo launchers or mobile launchers be depicted. The Russian side objected to the U.S.-proposed text in the ICBM base section (defining the boundaries of the ICBM base and the requirements for each simplified site diagram of the ICBM base that were duplicated elsewhere). Trout said the U.S. side would take these issues under consideration.

¶8. (S) On the issue of submarine base diagrams, Petrov said that the major roads connecting the storage facility for non-deployed SLBMs to the coastline should be depicted on a simplified site diagram.

¶9. (S) Petrov said the Russian proposal had a new section to address all other facilities beyond ICBM, submarine and air bases. This was generally reflected in paragraph 3 of the U.S. proposal. Trout said the U.S. side would review the Russian-proposed text and would soon be prepared to discuss it.

MOSTLY IN AGREEMENT

¶10. (S) Petrov then turned to the first part of the U.S.-proposed text, related to establishing requirements for site diagrams. He said the two sides were in general agreement for most of the section, but minor differences remained in subparagraphs (h) and (j). They would not be hard to resolve, however, as the definition of an item of inspection had been conformed and the two sides would soon discuss the U.S.-proposed wording regarding depiction of large structures on the site diagram. Petrov also said that the Russian side mostly agreed with the U.S.-proposed paragraph 4

(newly declared facilities).

THE MOST PAINFUL PART

¶11. (S) Orlov said the sides had now arrived at what would be the most painful, but the most interesting part of the meeting, the discussion of changes to site diagrams. Petrov talked about not violating the rights of inspectors to access everything within site boundaries during an inspection. The concern was with changes to the boundaries prior to an inspection. Trout reminded the Russian side of START procedures that had worked for many years and noted that the U.S. would likely be agreeable to a similar proposal. There was general agreement that if there were changes to structures at facilities within boundaries, the revised site diagram would be provided to the inspectors at the Pre-Inspection Review. If either side wanted to exclude a structure within the boundary, that issue would be handled within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. If the boundary of a facility were to increase in size, a notice would have to be sent to the other Party within a set timeframe which would be determined by the Notifications Working Group.

¶12. (S) Trout indicated that the Russian proposal for a 30-day period before such diagrams would have to be provided could become a problem. National Technical Means (NTM) might see items of inspection in the expanded area and then the observing Party would raise a complaint with the other Party. He noted that a notification only 72 hours after the change in the site boundary would decrease the chances of this occurring. He also indicated that this shorter timeframe would help inspection teams prepare with the most accurate information available.

QUESTIONS ON OTHER ISSUES

¶13. (S) Trout noted that the two sides were conceptually close on site diagrams, and it made sense to reorder the document as suggested by the Russian side. He stated the U.S. side would study the Russian-proposed text and create a JDT over the next few days.

¶14. (S) Trout questioned the inclusion of ICBM loading facilities as a category of data in Part Two and noted that they were deleted from the database categories in the Fall, but the Russian side subsequently asked for them to be added back in. Trout said the U.S. side started to look at the issue in Article IV of where deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs could be located and that it appeared they could only be located at ICBM bases. The moment an ICBM was loaded onto a previously non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs, which in the Russian model could occur at an ICBM loading

facility, it became deployed. Orlov noted the concern and said the Russian side needed to look further at the issue. Petrov talked through the situation where a submarine with non-deployed SLBM launchers arrived at a loading facility at the same time non-deployed SLBMs arrived for loading, and how notifications would be handled for the non-deployed SLBMs, non-deployed SLBM launchers, and the newly deployed SLBM launchers and SLBMs. This was a regular, well-understood occurrence that was accommodated by the treaty. He indicated that a similar arrangement needed to be worked out for mobile launchers of ICBMs to facilitate allowed operations.

¶15. (S) Petrov started to ask about size criteria for facilities, and LT Lobner addressed the issue of reference cylinders. These issues had been discussed briefly in the MOU Working Group in November, 2009 but it was decided that they would be addressed by the Inspection Protocol Working Group. Once inspection criteria were agreed, the appropriate text would be placed in Part Two of the Protocol (Database).

¶16. (S) Trout raised the issue of three engineering ICBM silos at Hill Air Force Base and plans to maintain a training ICBM silo at each U.S. ICBM base. Petrov acknowledged the plan to count them as training silos, just like in START. Petrov noted that the silos would be on site diagrams but would not be inspectable.

¶17. (S) Petrov asked about new treaty requirements for exchange of photographs, expressing that the Russian side wanted to establish the requirement as soon as possible so it could plan ahead for the right equipment. Trout said the U.S. side understood the concern and would review the equipment and procedures for acquiring photographs. He said that subject could be discussed after completing the issue of site diagrams.

JUST WHEN WE THOUGHT WE WERE DONE

¶18. (S) Mr. Pischulov read through the U.S.-proposed JDT of Part Two of the Protocol (Database) during the meeting, and he brought an issue to Orlovs attention. Pischulov noted that when he met with Lobner on February 17, he thought there was agreement on the use of unique identifiers (UIDs) on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. In reading the U.S. proposal, he did not find a requirement for UIDs for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, similar to the requirement for UIDs for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Trout said the U.S. side was still considering its position on the issue. He proceeded to explain that upon entry into force, all but one B-1B bomber would likely have been converted so that the heavy bombers would be incapable of employing nuclear armaments. The sole remaining B-1B capable of employing nuclear armaments would have been kept in that condition solely for the purpose of a distinguishing features

exhibition. Once all the B-1Bs were converted, they would no longer be subject to the treaty, and the associated data would not have to be recorded in the database. Pischulov said the Russian side was trying to look ahead for the duration of the treaty, and he asked if the U.S. might consider converting some B-52Hs.

¶19. (S) Orlov said that until the B-1B distinguishing features exhibition occurred, of course all the B-1Bs would have to be recorded in the database as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, regardless of their true status. Trout asked Orlov to clarify what he meant, and Orlov reiterated the Russian position. Trout asked if the United States conducted an exhibition prior to entry into force, would the heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments be removed from the treaty provisions. Orlov said they could be removed, but that position could change. Orlov reiterated the Russian position that all heavy bombers should have UIDs.

¶20. (S) Documents provided:

- UNITED STATES:

-- U.S. proposal for Joint Draft Text of Part Two of the Protocol (Database), dated February 18, 2010

- RUSSIA:

-- Russian proposal for Annex on Inspection Activities (Part Four, Procedures for Site Diagrams), dated February 18, 2010

-- Russian proposal for Joint Draft Text of Part Two of the Protocol (Database), dated February 18, 2010

¶21. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Mr. Trout

Mr. Brown

Mr. Evans (RO)

LT Lobner

LT Sicks

Mr. French (Int)

RUSSIA

Gen. Orlov

Mr. Ivanov

COL Petrov

Mr. Pischulov

Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶22. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING